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RIGHTS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AND GUN CONTROL

Most of the discourse concerning America’s political dysfunction, including
the discussion in this Symposium, has focused on structures and powers. In
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this Article we take up the question of whether rights have also contributed to
dysfunction. The question presented for our panel is: Has the Constitution
fostered a pathological rights culture of rights without responsibilities and
regulation? The case of the right to bear arms and gun control. In our recent
book, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues, we address
arguments that our constitutional system takes individual rights too seriously,
to the neglect of responsibilities, virtues, and the common good.1 Most
pertinent to this Article, we address criticisms that liberal theories of rights
“exalt rights over responsibilities, licensing irresponsible conduct and
spawning frivolous assertions of rights at the expense of encouraging personal
responsibility and responsibility to community.”2 Liberal theories, critics
contend, “take rights too absolutely, to the subordination of responsibilities,
virtues, and the common good.”3 Liberalism, critics claim, promotes “liberty as
license” rather than securing “ordered liberty.”4
Our book answers these and other charges against liberal theories of rights.
We propose an account of rights that takes responsibilities as well as rights
seriously, permitting government to encourage responsibility in the exercise of
rights but not to compel what it holds is the responsible decision. We defend
our understanding of the relationships among rights, responsibilities, and
virtues by applying that understanding to several matters of current
controversy: reproductive freedom, the proper roles and regulation of civil
society and the family, education of children, clashes between First
Amendment freedoms (of association and religion) and antidiscrimination law,
and rights to intimate association and same-sex marriage. Our book aims to
provide a guiding framework for pursuing ordered liberty by taking
responsibilities and civic virtues, as well as rights, seriously.5 In this Article,
we take up one matter of controversy that our book does not address: the
Second Amendment and its import for regulation of guns. We offer here some
preliminary thoughts about “ordered gun liberty.”
Ordered Liberty focuses on cases protecting substantive basic liberties (or
not) under the Due Process Clause, rather than more broadly covering the full
universe of constitutional rights, including the Second Amendment. That focus
reflects the fact that these cases raise the “culture war” issues that divide
liberals from communitarians like Mary Ann Glendon6 and civic republicans
like Michael Sandel.7 Moreover, the cases involve issues that have constituted
1

JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 1 (2013).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 2.
6 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
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the most contested battlegrounds concerning rights, responsibilities, and
virtues in recent years.
That focus explains why the book, as Gerard Magliocca observed,
“mentions guns only in passing.”8 Specifically, our book mentions President
Obama’s call for “more civility in our public discourse”9 in the aftermath of
the shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and others at a political rally
in Tucson10 and quotes a comment on the absence of self-regulation by the gun
industry: “The premise seems to be that if they’ve got the right to do
something, then that’s the right thing to do.”11 Magliocca aptly wonders “how
the right identified in Heller [the individual right to bear arms] fits into [our]
framework.”12 We are grateful to him for posing this timely and important
question. Indeed, if we had still been writing the book on December 15, 2012,
the day after the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown,
Connecticut,13 we likely would have included a fuller discussion of the
individual right to bear arms. After all, that right is particularly well suited to
our treatment of the “irresponsibility critique” of rights – that rights license
irresponsible conduct and preclude government from promoting the
responsible exercise of rights.14 Certainly, the charges of rights absolutism
sound frequently in discussions of opposition to gun control. In his informative
book, Gunfight, Adam Winkler details the “extremism that marks America’s
current gun debate,” suggesting that, if one side seeks rights without
regulation, the other seeks regulation without rights.15
In this Article, we sketch some preliminary thoughts about the individual
right to bear arms in relation to responsibilities, virtues, and regulation. As we
begin to think about such issues, we immediately confront a conundrum. On
the one hand, there is no individual right that cries out more for governmental
encouragement of responsibility concerning its exercise and for governmental
regulation to promote safety and to protect from harm. On the other hand, there

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO
DO? (2009).
8 Gerard Magliocca, Ordered Liberty and Guns, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 20, 2013, 11:09
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/02/ordered-liberty-and-guns.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/4L9U-ZYJ8.
9 Helene Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Calls Americans to a New Era of Civility, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, at A1.
10 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 43.
11 Id. at 286 n.124 (quoting Erik Larson, The Story of a Gun, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1993, at
48).
12 Magliocca, supra note 8.
13 James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead,
Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1.
14 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 18-49.
15 ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA
11-14 (2011).
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is no individual right whose defenders more strenuously reject such
governmental promotion of responsibility and regulation. Defenders of the
individual right to bear arms, including the National Rifle Association (NRA),
have been extremely effective in making slippery slope arguments: for
example, that allowing evidently reasonable regulations will lead to
disarmament.16 This type of slippery slope argument frequently takes hold in
circumstances where citizens distrust the government, and such circumstances
are not propitious for arguments about responsibility or reasonable regulation
to promote safety and to prevent harm. And so, any attempt to relate the
individual right to bear arms to responsibilities, virtues, and regulation will
face serious obstacles. Still, the stakes are high enough to make it worthwhile
to undertake the effort.
To put the challenges in stark relief, consider the following hypothetical
slippery slope arguments against governmental regulations:
• Imagine a world in which people opposed motor vehicle registration laws
out of fear that they were a first step toward governmental confiscation of all
motor vehicles.
• Imagine a world in which people opposed draft registration laws on the
ground that they would lead inexorably from involuntary military service to
enslavement of all by the government.
• Imagine a world in which people opposed public education out of fear that
government would brainwash people into surrendering their liberties.
• Finally, imagine a world in which people feared that laws requiring
registration of title in land were an initial step toward governmental
expropriation of all real property.
We likely would think that something was wrong in each of these worlds,
perhaps too absolutist a conception of rights or too suspicious a conception of
government. Perhaps we would frame what was wrong in terms of dysfunction,
breakdown, or failure. Yet our world looks like these hypothetical worlds when
it comes to gun rights proponents’ arguments against reasonable gun control
regulation.
Furthermore, the present public division over gun regulation illustrates how
people may have sharply conflicting views about what is the “responsible”
thing to do. For example, many people (ourselves included) believe that, in the
wake of the school shooting in Newtown and all too many other public
shootings, reasonable regulation of guns is both imperative and the responsible
policy choice. Others argue that putting more guns in the hands of good and
responsible citizens – in schools, on campuses, and elsewhere – is the
solution.17 And, in fact, most changes in gun control laws since Newtown have

16

Id. at 8.
See, e.g., Wayne LaPierre, Making Our Nation’s School Children Safer, NRA INST.
FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 1, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2013/6/
making-our-nations-school-children-safer.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/FZ87-9GH4.
17
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loosened restrictions and regulations rather than tightening them.18 On the
latter view, responsible citizens arm themselves in anticipation of violent
sprees. On the former view, responsible citizens do not need weapons designed
for military use and should support regulations to take those weapons out of
commerce. All this debate confirms that the time is ripe for fuller analysis of
the relationship between the individual right to bear arms and responsibilities,
virtues, and regulation. That analysis reveals that, notwithstanding the rhetoric
of rights absolutism, ordered gun liberty supports a “reasonable right to bear
arms” that also recognizes the proper role of regulation.19
II.
A.

REVISITING GLENDON’S AND WEST’S CRITIQUES OF RIGHTS TALK AND
CALLS FOR RESPONSIBILITY TALK
The “Irresponsibility Critique” of Rights

Just over twenty years ago, Mary Ann Glendon published Rights Talk: The
Impoverishment of Political Discourse20 and Robin West published Foreword:
Taking Freedom Seriously.21 From fundamentally different perspectives, the
conservative communitarian Glendon and the progressive feminist West
articulated what we have termed the “irresponsibility critique” of rights and
called for responsibility talk.22 Neither Glendon nor West wrote about gun
rights talk in particular, but we can readily adapt their critiques to the
individual right to bear arms that we see championed in the United States
leading up to and in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller.23
18

Karen Yourish & Larry Buchanan, State Gun Laws Enacted in Year Since Newtown,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2013, at A20. Moreover, the “counterreaction” to the initial “burst of
gun-control legislation,” post-Newtown, appears to be spreading, with new laws “allowing
weapons in all corners of society” and strengthening “Stand Your Ground laws.” Herbert
Buchsbaum, Amid Wave of Pro-Gun Legislation, Georgia Proposes Sweeping Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2014, at A14 (observing that while “there was a flurry of gun-control
legislation” after Newtown, “in the 12 months immediately afterward, states passed 39 laws
to tighten gun restrictions and 70 to loosen them”).
19 WINKLER, supra note 15, at 294.
20 GLENDON, supra note 6.
21
Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990).
22 See GLENDON, supra note 6, at 17 (critiquing America’s “progress in making rights a
reality,” while neglecting the responsibilities associated with these rights); West, supra note
21, at 47 (arguing for a “reformulation of liberal ideals in American culture that would take
seriously not only the individual’s demand for rights but also the burdens of his
responsibility”).
23 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (holding that the District of Columbia’s ban on handgun
possession violated the Second Amendment). For a very valuable account of the Heller
case, see generally WINKLER, supra note 15, at 1-14. Joseph Blocher’s contribution to this
Symposium is an insightful contribution to the analysis of gun rights talk. Joseph Blocher,
Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014).
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In Ordered Liberty, we are critical of Glendon’s analysis, arguing that she is
ultimately wrong about rights talk as applied, for example, to the right to
abortion.24 Building upon West’s analysis, we argue that the cases protecting
the right to abortion, especially Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,25 leave more room for government to encourage
responsible exercise of rights than Glendon acknowledged.26 But here, in the
context of the individual right to bear arms, Glendon’s analysis of rights talk
may have greater force (at least as of 2014, whatever might have been the case
in 1991). In this Section, we distill several features of the irresponsibility
critique of rights and sketch how they apply to gun rights talk. Strikingly,
although Glendon did not write about the Second Amendment, she uncannily
insinuated that the “lone rights bearer” she was criticizing was a gunslinger
who “r[o]de into town.”27 Equally strikingly, while Roberto Unger (like West,
a progressive critic of rights talk) did not write specifically about the individual
right to bear arms, he uncannily characterized rights themselves as being like
“a loaded gun that the rightholder may shoot at will in his corner of town.”28
First, Glendon criticizes the “illusion of absoluteness” in rights talk.29 She
contends that absolutist rights talk has led Americans carelessly to deploy “the
rhetoric of rights” as though rights trump everything else and to develop a
constitutional jurisprudence of rights isolated from “common sense,”
reasonable, and necessary limitations on rights in a system of “ordered
liberty.”30 She suggests that liberal theories take rights too absolutely, to the
exclusion of encouraging responsibility and inculcating civic virtue.31
As explicated below, we certainly see the illusion of absoluteness in gun
rights talk. For gun rights advocates argue that the individual right to bear arms
is a “fundamental right” triggering (pun intended) “strict scrutiny.”32 This
entails, on their view, that most common sense, reasonable regulations
concerning guns are unconstitutional. They say this even in the face of Justice
Scalia’s statement in Heller that many traditional gun control regulations are

24

FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 56-72.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 50-80. To be sure, Rights Talk predated Casey,
but in subsequent writing Glendon continues to criticize the Court’s abortion jurisprudence
(including Casey) for its vision of rights, autonomy, and freedom. For discussion of
Glendon’s critique, see id. at 56-68.
27 GLENDON, supra note 6, at 47-75.
28 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 36 (1986).
29 GLENDON, supra note 6, at 18-46.
30 Id. at 177-83.
31 Id. at 14, 18-46.
32 Voting “YES on 2” Means Getting the Gold Standard for Gun Rights in Louisiana,
NRA INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, http://www.nraila.org/YESon2 (last visited Mar. 18,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JDP-5ZS3.
25
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“presumptively lawful,”33 which hardly sounds like strict scrutiny
automatically invalidating such regulations. We will return to the question of
the appropriate level of scrutiny below.
Second, Glendon, like West and others in academia, political life, and
popular media, argue that rights license irresponsibility. They claim that
Americans increasingly invoke rights talk and shrink from responsibility talk,
resulting in an explosion of frivolous assertions of rights and a breakdown of
responsible conduct.34 The problem is framed generally as “too many rights”
and “too few responsibilities.”35 In our book, Ordered Liberty, we distinguish
two strands of the irresponsibility critique, “immunity” and “wrongness”:
The immunity critique recognizes that a legal right creates a realm within
which one is free from coercion and not legally responsible or
accountable to others for social costs or harms resulting from one’s
actions. The problematic implications of this immunity are that rights are
trumps, overriding the common good, and they insulate a right-holder
from the moral scrutiny or disapproval of others. The wrongness critique
observes that having a legal right to do something does not mean that it is
the right thing to do. Regrettably, critics claim, rights talk suggests that
the existence of a right implies the nonexistence of responsibilities
constraining its exercise.36
Both strands of the irresponsibility critique readily apply to gun rights talk.
In this context we return to a comment on the absence of self-regulation by the
gun industry: “The premise seems to be that if they’ve got the right to do
something, then that’s the right thing to do.”37 We use this quotation to
illustrate the “gap between rights and rightness.”38 A further premise seems to
be that, if persons have an individual right to bear arms, then government may
not moralize concerning responsible exercise of the right and may not regulate
in an attempt to close that gap.
B.

The Immunity and Wrongness Critiques Applied to the Right to Bear Arms

Gun rights advocates have effectively deflected the immunity and
wrongness critiques or, in some cases, have even turned them against the
critics themselves. First, we address the wrongness critique. Gun rights
advocates seem to equate rights with rightness. On their view, they have a right
to keep and bear arms and therefore it is right for them to do so.
Notwithstanding the wrongness critique – that it is wrong and dangerous to

33

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 n.26 (2008).
GLENDON, supra note 6, at 14-17; West, supra note 21, at 81-85.
35 AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 161 (1993).
36 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 5; see also id. at 30-49.
37 Id. at 286 n.124 (quoting Larson, supra note 11, at 48).
38 Id. at 39-43.
34

AND THE

856

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:849

keep and bear arms without responsibility and without regulation – they
valorize keeping and bearing arms, arguing that it is virtuous and responsible
to do so. They argue, moreover, that keeping and bearing arms teaches
responsibility. And they wish to transmit these values – such as respect for
guns – to their children.39 This is a right of virtuous, responsible citizens to
defend themselves and their hearths and homes rather than being dependent
upon government to do so. Furthermore, as they see it, keeping and bearing
arms is part of American tradition and identity. It is part of their very picture of
what it means to be an American. As Jimmie Rodgers puts it in the memorable
song, “Pistol Packin’ Papa,” they “come from a shootin’ race.”40
Second, we address the immunity critique. Gun rights advocates seem to
think that they should be immune from governmental regulation and
moralizing concerning the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms. Any
criticism of keeping and bearing guns, and any call for reasonable regulation
(even to protect children), is met with the slippery slope arguments discussed
above – that regulation will inevitably lead to disarmament,41 or the oftrepeated adage that “outlawing” guns will mean that “only outlaws will have
guns.”42 While some proponents of gun control have supported such
disarmament, and thus have been characterized as gun control extremists, it has
been clear since Heller that any governmental effort to impose civil
disarmament is not in the realm of constitutional possibility.43 Thus, postHeller, this form of slippery slope argument is clearly tactical rather than
rooted in any reasonable apprehension.44 This form of slippery slope argument

39

See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
JIMMIE RODGERS, PISTOL PACKIN’ PAPA (RCA Victor 1930). This song cleverly
encapsulates many of the themes that we see today in the rhetoric and presuppositions of
gun rights advocates. We reprint the lyrics of the song in the Appendix.
41 See, e.g., LaPierre, supra note 17 (“With the horrific series of mass murders
culminating in the cold-blooded killing of children and teachers at the Sandy Hook
Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., last December, this latest iteration of ‘gun control’
is entirely directed at making the sane pay the price for unthinkable acts committed by the
insane. It is the root of the civil disarmament movement in America today.”). There seems
to be a meme in the discourse: Do not think of it as “gun control”; think of it as “victim
disarmament.” We see the slippery slope argument concerning disarmament not only among
extremists like the NRA’s LaPierre but also among serious, reasonable scholars like Robert
Cottrol. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottroll, Second Amendment: Not Constitutional Dysfunction but
Necessary Safeguard, 94 B.U. L. REV. 835, 841 (2014) (suggesting that disarmament is the
aim of gun control advocates).
42 See, e.g., When Guns Are Outlawed, Only Outlaws Will Have Guns, DEBATE,
http://www.debate.org/debates/When-guns-are-outlawed-only-outlaws-will-have-guns. (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZG68-C7CJ.
43 WINKLER, supra note 15, at 9-11, 294 (“Private ownership of guns cannot be
completely banned, and the civilian disarmament long desired by anti-gun people is now
constitutionally impossible.”).
44 Id. at 294-95.
40
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from rights absolutists aims to silence the moral voice of the community
calling for reasonable regulation and responsible exercise of the right to keep
and bear arms – or at least to make it harder to raise that moral voice.
Worse yet, when people and government reject gun rights advocates’ bid for
immunity and raise the moral voice of the community – whether as individuals
condemning gun violence and calling for gun control or as the government
passing gun control laws – the gun rights advocates try to shame those people
and the government. For example, in Dallas, Texas, during a recent event held
by the local chapter of Moms Demand Action for Gun Sense in America, a gun
rights organization called Open Carry Texas came to the parking lot outside
with shotguns, hunting rifles, AR-15s, and AK-47s.45 Indeed, some gun rights
advocates, including Senator Ted Cruz, say that people who raise the moral
voice of the community have no shame; they are callously exploiting tragedies
like the Newtown massacre in making the case for gun control.46 Nay, it is
worse still: gun rights advocates commonly say that those who have raised the
moral voice of the community and enacted gun control measures are
responsible for the deaths in such massacres. As Larry Pratt of Gun Owners of
America charged, gun control advocates have the blood of the victims of
Newtown on their hands, because through their misguided gun control
regulations they created gun-free zones like schools where madmen can work
their mayhem without fear of themselves being shot. It would be better, the
argument goes, to have people in schools armed rather than leaving them
vulnerable.47 As Wayne LaPierre of the NRA put it: “The only thing that stops
a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”48
Finally, the upshot of all this is that the calls for gun control seem only to
spur people to buy more guns.49 Why? We suppose because the irresponsible

45 Manny Fernandez, A Face-Off Outside Dallas in the Escalating Battle over Texas’
Gun Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2013, at A14.
46 Melanie Hunter, Cruz: Obama Exploited Newtown Tragedy to Push Gun Control
Agenda, CNS NEWS (Jan. 21, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/cruz-obamaexploited-newtown-tragedy-push-gun-control-agenda, archived at http://perma.cc/D42C-9R
PZ.
47 Wayne LaPierre, Exec. Vice President, NRA, Remarks at an NRA Press Conference
(Dec. 21, 2012) (“Politicians pass laws for Gun-Free School Zones. They issue press
releases bragging about them. They post signs advertising them. And in doing so, they tell
every insane killer in America that schools are their safest place to inflict maximum
mayhem with minimum risk.”); Larry Pratt, They Have Blood on Their Hands, GUN
OWNERS AM. (Dec. 16, 2012, 7:38 PM), http://gunowners.org/a12152012.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/N829-923A.
48 LaPierre, supra note 47; see also Eric Lichtblau & Motoko Rich, N.R.A. Envisions “a
Good Guy with a Gun” in Every School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A1 (quoting
LaPierre, supra note 47).
49 Michael Cooper, Sales of Guns Soar in U.S. as Nation Weighs Tougher Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, at A1.
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slippery slope rhetoric concerning the fear of disarmament has been so
effective.
C.

The Loci of Responsibility Talk Concerning the Right to Bear Arms

There are several loci of responsibility talk in the discourse concerning the
individual right to bear arms that we will consider. First, in the very
conceptualization of the right holder. For example, there are references in
Heller to the right of responsible gun owners: “The Second Amendment . . .
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”50 Second, in the very
conceptualization of the right. For example, one might speak of the right of
responsible gun ownership.51 Third, in the conceptualization of the regulations
surrounding the right. For example, one might defend responsible gun
regulation.52 Fourth, in the conceptualization of the responsibilities of gun
manufacturers.53 One might decry gun manufacturers’ irresponsibility in
marketing guns to children, and those manufacturers might retort by urging
responsibility in the use of firearms (just as marketers of alcoholic beverages
exhort consumers to drink responsibly). Fifth, in the conceptualization of the
responsibilities of government. One view is that the first duty of government is
to provide for the security of all and to protect people from harm.54 Another
view is that government should encourage responsible exercise of the right to
bear arms. For example, a recently enacted Missouri law encourages school
districts to educate children (beginning in first grade) concerning gun safety.55
50 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). The American gun rights
landscape is dotted with groups like the Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners,
Doctors for Responsible Gun Owners, and Lawful and Responsible Gun Owners.
51 For example, in the aftermath of the Newtown mass shooting, Marco Rubio’s Senate
office released a statement affirming his support for “the Second Amendment right to safely
and responsibly bear arms.” Alex Conant, Press Sec’y for U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, The
Future of Gun Control, MARCO RUBIO (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/fighting-for-florida?ID=6680e1e6-bd61-4f90-b56d-0f3cbd9c0600, archived at
http://perma.cc/WMN9-2EZV.
52 For example, Americans for Responsible Solutions, a group founded by
Congresswoman Gabby Giffords and her husband Captain Mark Kelly after she was shot in
Tucson, defines its mission as supporting “commonsense protections from gun violence”
and “lawmakers willing to take a stand for responsible policies.” About, AMS. FOR
RESPONSIBLE SOLUTIONS, http://americansforresponsiblesolutions.org/about (last visited
Mar. 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/D8KN-V9JM.
53 Since the 1990s, more than thirty U.S. cities, counties, or states have filed suits against
U.S. gun manufacturers claiming that they have failed to implement responsible sales
practices. Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Gun Makers Shun Responsibility for Sales, Suits
Show, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2013, at A1.
54 Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 893, 908-09 (2014).
55 Mo. Gov. Signs Gun-Safety Course for First-Graders, NEWS TRIB. (July 12, 2013),
http://www.newstribune.com/news/2013/jul/12/mo-gov-signs-gun-safety-course-first-

2014]

ORDERED GUN LIBERTY

859

Sixth, in the conceptualization of the responsibilities of parents: for example,
to keep firearms in safe places and to educate children concerning gun safety.56
We will return to these matters below.
Finally, we see responsibility talk in the placement of responsibility for
deaths in gun massacres. Proponents of gun control take the view that the
widespread, easy availability of guns is partly responsible for these massacres,
and that government has a responsibility to pass reasonable gun control
regulations to provide security for all and to protect people from harm.57 By
contrast, as mentioned above, some proponents of gun rights take a different
view: that supporters of gun control regulations are responsible for the
massacres.58 On this view, if only we had more guns in schools and in the
hands of responsible citizens generally, we would have fewer massacres and
less crime more generally.59 As Jimmie Rodgers’s “Pistol Packin’ Papa” puts
it: “The hold-up men all know me, and they sure leave me be; I’m a pistol
packin’ papa, and I ramble where I please.”60
III. ORDERED GUN LIBERTY: ANALOGIES BETWEEN SECOND AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AND OTHER RIGHTS
With other rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to procreative
autonomy, individuals can and do raise their voices to urge the responsible
exercise of rights and, when the gap between rights and rightness seems too
great, to urge regulation of or restriction upon rights.61 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Heller acknowledged that “the Second Amendment right is not
unlimited” and that reasonable regulations concerning the individual right to
bear arms might pass constitutional muster, or at least left open the question
whether such regulations might do so.62 As Winkler observes, Heller in one
sense reaffirmed longstanding American practice of reasonable gun regulation;
tellingly, in the flurry of post-Heller lawsuits challenging gun laws, only a few

graders, archived at http://perma.cc/4WX4-L6CQ.
56 BRIAN KEVIN, GUN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2012).
57 E.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Do We Have the Courage to Stop This?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2012, at SR11. Winkler’s book offers several examples of how shooters in some of these
massacres got access to guns due to lax regulation, for example, through the “gun show
loophole.” WINKLER, supra note 15, at 73-76.
58 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48; see also JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS,
LESS CRIME (3d ed. 2010) (arguing that increased gun ownership decreases crime).
60 RODGERS, supra note 40.
61 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 43-45.
62 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008) (“[N]othing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places . . . .”).
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of the “over 150 federal court rulings” have invalidated such laws.63
Responsible exercise of First Amendment rights is also relevant, as
manufacturers of target-shooting video games offer the chance to use military
weapons in virtual reality and prime consumers’ (including children’s)
appetites for such weapons in real life.64 The New York Times also reports that
the “youth-marketing effort is backed by extensive social research and is
carried out by an array of nonprofit groups financed by the gun industry.”65
Constitutional law cases would support governmental moralizing about
responsible exercise of the individual right to bear arms by analogy to
moralizing encouraging responsible exercise of the right to procreative
autonomy.66 For example, the government might impose a waiting period
before one may purchase a gun.67 Indeed, back in the 1970s before the NRA
had adopted such a hardline stance against gun regulation, it supported waiting
periods; NRA Secretary Frank C. Daniel observed that “waiting periods have
‘not proved to be an undue burden on the shooter and the sportsman,’” and that
a waiting period law “‘adequately protects citizens of good character.’”68 Or
government might distribute literature concerning the responsibilities of gun
ownership and gun safety to prospective gun purchasers.69
Furthermore, there may be analogies between gun ownership and driving.70
To get a driver’s license, one has to pass a written test and a road test. The
government might require applicants for gun permits to take a written test

63

WINKLER, supra note 15, at 289.
Mike McIntire, Selling a New Generation on Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, at A1
(listing “developing a target-shooting video game that promotes brand-name weapons” as
one of the firearms industry’s strategies to “ensure its future by getting guns into the hands
of more, and younger, children”).
65 Id.
66 For our analysis of governmental moralizing encouraging responsible exercise of the
right to procreative autonomy, see FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 50-75.
67 As of June 24, 2013, ten states and the District of Columbia have imposed waiting
periods on the purchase of some or all guns. Waiting Periods Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (June 24, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/waiting-periods-policysummary/#footnote_13_5825, archived at http://perma.cc/P39F-4C6S.
68 WINKLER, supra note 15, at 70 (quoting Alan Webber, Where the NRA Stands on Gun
Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1968, at 22-23).
69 The teaching materials for the firearms safety courses required in some states for
receiving a gun permit typically include such responsibility talk. See, e.g., infra note 71.
70 See Scott Burris, Gun Violence: Lessons Learned from Car Crashes, BILL HEALTH
(Dec. 19, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2012/12/19/gun-regulation-phlrneeded/#more-3721, archived at http://perma.cc/S63F-BNZK (likening responsibility and
regulation in gun use to the regulation of automobile safety); David Frum, What If We
Treated Guns Like Cars?, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/09/17/what-if-we-treated-guns-like-cars.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FU8
D-74XK (arguing for gun regulation to improve public safety by citing successful
improvements to auto safety achieved through regulation).
64
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concerning the operation of guns and gun safety.71 Carrying the analogy
further, the government might require applicants to demonstrate proficiency in
gun operation and safety by passing a skills performance test.72 The
requirements for concealed carry permits vary, but they are a good
illustration.73 Or, like owners of motor vehicles, gun owners might be required
to carry liability insurance.74
Some may resist the analogy between gun ownership and driving. They may
say that there is a right to bear arms but no right to drive, only a privilege to do
so, subject to governmental permission and regulation. But does anyone who
draws this distinction seriously believe that if the Supreme Court of the United
States held that there is a constitutional right to drive that its doing so would
imperil any of the basic regulations of driving? Would they seriously argue
that the government could no longer require driver’s licenses (including the
passage of written and road tests), impose reasonable safety regulations
concerning automobile inspections and speed limits, or require the purchase of
automobile liability insurance? The analogy holds.
More generally, many rights, even “fundamental” rights like the right to
marry, are subject to numerous governmental regulations (including licensing),
as we discuss in the next Part.
IV. THE MYTHS OF STRICT SCRUTINY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In Ordered Liberty, we address the “absoluteness” critique of rights by
considering arguments that “fundamental rights” trigger “strict scrutiny” under
which regulations are practically automatically unconstitutional.75 We do so in
the context of the Due Process Clause (as well as the Equal Protection

71 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(f) (McKinney 2008) (“No license shall be issued
or renewed except for an applicant . . . who has successfully completed a firearms safety
course and test as evidenced by a certificate of completion issued in his or her name and
endorsed and affirmed under the penalties of perjury by a duly authorized instructor . . . .”);
NYS Pistol Permit Class, FIREARMS TRAINING OF W.N.Y., http://ftwny.com/coursedetails
(last visited Mar. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/725L-75KY; see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 29-28(b)(1) (2009) (requiring applications for a handgun carry permit to complete a
firearm training program); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306 (2013) (same); N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 13:54-2.4 (2013) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1315 (2013) (same).
72 See sources cited supra note 71. These firearms safety courses include training in
proficiency of use of the weapons, not just written instruction and exams.
73 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60(4) (West 2013) (providing training requirements
for obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon).
74 Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Buying a Gun? States Consider Insurance
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A1; Rob Hillenbrand, Heller on the Threshold: Crafting
a Gun Insurance Mandate (Mar. 29, 2014) (unpublished note) (on file with the Boston
University Law Review).
75 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 237-41.
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Clause).76 Glendon argued that such arguments about rights manifest the
“illusion of absoluteness”77 and the “impoverishment of judgment.”78
Dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia stated that, under the Due
Process Clause, if an asserted liberty is a “fundamental right,” it receives
“strict scrutiny” that almost automatically invalidates any statute restricting
it.79 He also wrote that if an asserted liberty is not a fundamental right, it is
merely a “liberty interest” that gets rational basis scrutiny, a standard that is so
deferential that the Court all but automatically upholds the statute in
question.80 Lawrence deviated from this regime. The Court did not hold that
homosexuals’ right to autonomy was a fundamental right requiring strict
scrutiny, nor did it hold that their right was merely a liberty interest calling for
highly deferential rational basis scrutiny.81 Instead, the Court applied an
intermediate standard – what we call “rational basis scrutiny with bite” – and
struck down the statute forbidding same-sex sexual conduct.82 Consequently,
Justice Scalia chastised the Court for deviating from the rigid two-tier
framework that all but automatically decides rights questions one way or the
other.83
In Ordered Liberty, we debunk the myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause (scrutiny that is so strict as to preclude
regulation or governmental encouragement of responsible exercise of rights).84
That myth has been propounded by opponents of substantive due process like
Justice Scalia to make it harder to justify protecting rights of privacy or
autonomy.85 Supporters of substantive due process rights of privacy or
autonomy have fallen for this myth and helped perpetuate it.86 We show that
the only case under the Due Process Clause ever to recognize a fundamental
right implicating strict scrutiny – requiring that the statute further a compelling
governmental interest and be necessary to doing so – was Roe v. Wade.87 And
we point out that those aspects of Roe were overruled in Casey, which

76

Id. at 237-72.
GLENDON, supra note 6, at 14, 40.
78 Id. passim.
79 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 593-94.
81 See id. at 594.
82 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 267-69.
83 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 237-72.
85 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 237-41 (“[L]iberal constitutional theorists
who defend substantive due process typically love talk of ‘taking rights seriously,’ and it is
no surprise that they might think that the best way to take rights seriously is to declare them
to be ‘fundamental rights’ and subject restrictions upon or regulations of them to ‘strict
scrutiny.’”).
87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
77
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substituted an “undue burden” test for strict scrutiny and pointedly avoided
calling the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy a
“fundamental right.”88 Going through due process cases protecting liberty and
autonomy – from Meyer v. Nebraska89 through Casey and Lawrence, we show
that due process jurisprudence is not so absolutist nor does it reflect such an
impoverishment of judgment.90
In summary, we conclude that:
[The] cases reflect what Casey and Justice Harlan called “reasoned
judgment” concerning our “rational continuum” of “ordered liberty.”
Indeed, they have involved judgment of the very sort that Glendon calls
for and that Scalia would banish. The constitutional liberalism developed
in our book does not seek to protect rights absolutely or to avoid
judgment in interpreting rights. Instead, it justifies reasoned judgment,
which protects important rights stringently but does not preclude
government from encouraging responsibility or inculcating civic
virtues.91
We take an analogous approach to the right to bear arms.
In the context of the Second Amendment, there is another version of the
myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights. We acknowledge that Winkler
has made a different version of this argument.92 One formulation is as simple
as this – the individual right to bear arms is a fundamental right; therefore it
triggers strict scrutiny (with well-nigh absolute protection); therefore
restrictions upon or regulations of the right are presumptively
unconstitutional.93 In other formulations this claim is supplemented by the
separate claim that the individual right to bear arms is analogous to other
fundamental rights, like those protected under the First Amendment. The
presupposition is that First Amendment rights receive strict scrutiny.
Therefore, the argument continues, the fundamental right to bear arms gets
strict scrutiny, and all restrictions upon or regulations of it are presumptively
invalid.94
88

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 876 (1993).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 403 (1923).
90 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 239-69.
91 Id. at 239.
92 Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. Adam Winkler, The Right to Bear Arms and the Myth of Strict Scrutiny, PRAWFS
BLAWG (Feb. 2, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/theright-to-be.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GQ3T-PG8U (“[J]ust because the Second
Amendment might be read to protect an individual right does not mean that strict scrutiny is
required.”).
93 See WINKLER, supra note 15, at 219.
94 See Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 834 (D.N.J. 2012), aff’d sub nom.
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (analogizing First and Second Amendment
strict scrutiny).
89
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The first obstacle to these arguments is that Heller did not say that the
“fundamental right” of an individual to bear arms triggers strict scrutiny; to the
contrary, it characterized many traditional gun control regulations as
“presumptively lawful.”95 This characterization itself is inconsistent with strict
scrutiny. The second obstacle is that in many areas of constitutional law,
“fundamental rights” do not actually receive the type of strict scrutiny that
automatically invalidates regulations of them. We will mention several.
First, consider the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech. We
should acknowledge that Joseph Blocher has extensively explored this matter
in other work on categoricalism and balancing in First Amendment and Second
Amendment analysis.96 To be sure, content-based restrictions on expression
have been held to be “presumptively invalid” and to receive strict scrutiny.97
But content-neutral regulations of conduct that incidentally suppress
expression have been subjected to a form of intermediate scrutiny.98 The same
is true with content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.99 Also some
forms of expression, like commercial expression, have been subjected to a
form of intermediate scrutiny.100
We do not think that gun control regulations are analogous to content-based
restrictions on expression that trigger strict scrutiny. They are more analogous
to content-neutral regulations of conduct that receive a form of intermediate
scrutiny. Indeed, many gun control laws are analogous to time, place, and
manner regulations, which also get a form of intermediate scrutiny. We grant
that people may think that they are expressing who they are through
purchasing guns and even carrying them openly in public, but that hardly
means that doing so is purely expression and not conduct subject to any
regulation whatsoever.

95

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 n.26 (2008).
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 379 (2009) (comparing Justices Scalia and Breyer’s
disagreement over a categorical versus a balancing approach in the Second Amendment
context to Justices Black and Frankfurter’s disagreement over these approaches in the First
Amendment context).
97 E.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 395 (1992).
98
E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (articulating a four-factor
framework for analyzing such regulations that is more lenient than strict scrutiny).
99 E.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981) (approving of content-neutral restrictions on time, place, and manner of speech that
serve a “significant governmental interest”). In fact, some courts interpreting the Second
Amendment have made this point. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 9697 (3d Cir. 2010).
100 E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-72
(1980) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to commercial expression); see also
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 (“Regulations on nonmisleading commercial speech trigger
another form of intermediate scrutiny . . . .”).
96

2014]

ORDERED GUN LIBERTY

865

There is more to First Amendment fundamental rights than freedom of
speech. There is also freedom of religion. But let us not forget the story of
Employment Division v. Smith101 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). In Smith, Justice Scalia’s opinion said that laws challenged in First
Amendment free exercise claims do not have to meet a “compelling interest”
test (the test of strict scrutiny) and are not “presumptively invalid.”102 In
reaction, Congress passed RFRA to “restore the compelling interest test.”103
Then, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments.104 And so,
according to the Supreme Court, First Amendment free exercise claims, though
implicating a fundamental right, do not necessarily get strict scrutiny.
It is said that the right to vote is fundamental,105 yet we have many
regulations of voting, such as voter registration requirements. In recent years
many have worried that voting laws justified as preventing voter fraud and in a
sense furthering “responsible voting” – for example, voter identification laws –
in fact are a form of voter suppression.106 But, as far as we know, no one has
gone so far as to argue that the requirement of voter registration itself violates
the fundamental right to vote.
The analogies to basic gun control regulations are clear enough. Surely, for
example, government may require registration by gun owners and conduct
background checks as a prerequisite to purchasing a gun and require permits
for open carry. Moreover, surely government may encourage people to vote
and to exercise their right to vote responsibly by informing themselves of the
candidates and the issues. By analogy, surely government may encourage
people who wish to keep and bear arms to do so responsibly. Surely
government may encourage gun education and gun safety. Surely, all this is
permissible even if the right to bear arms, like the right to vote, is a
fundamental right.

101

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 888 (“[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest
of the highest order.”).
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
104
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34, 536 (1997) (rejecting RFRA’s
requirement that “a State . . . demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show that
it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving it,” but leaving undecided whether the
federal government must meet that standard).
105 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[T]he right
to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society.”).
106 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Voter Suppression’s New Pretext, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2013, at A19 (describing arguments made by supporters of voter-ID and registration laws as
“specious”).
102
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As noted previously, Roe said that the right of a woman to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy was a fundamental right that triggered strict scrutiny.107
But, as also noted previously, Casey rejected strict scrutiny in favor of an
undue burden standard.108 Many scholars have written with illumination about
guns, abortion, and the culture wars.109 In rich and complex ways they have
explored analogies between the right to abortion and the right to bear arms.
Heller and Roe in some sense are opposing icons: the champions of Heller are
dismayed by Roe and vice versa. Yet some have drawn parallels between the
two.110 The battle over guns is not only about guns, just as the battle over
abortion is not only about abortion. Instead, the battles are about (1) competing
approaches to constitutional interpretation (originalism in Heller versus moral
readings in Roe) and (2) competing pictures of American identity and values,
culture wars, red states versus blue states, and the like. We do not intend to
cover all of the ground in this fertile field of analogies. We focus on the
irresponsibility critique of rights and analogies between guns and abortion with
respect to it.
We briefly mention a few analogies between abortion regulations and gun
control regulations (all of which involve governmental attempts to encourage
responsible exercise of rights). Above, we mention waiting periods.111 If it is
permissible for government to encourage women contemplating having an
abortion to deliberate conscientiously before doing so, it should be permissible
for government to encourage persons contemplating purchasing a gun to
exercise a sober second thought.112 In both instances government may
encourage conscientious deliberation and responsible reflection before
exercising a right. We also alluded to informed consent. If it is permissible for
government to seek to insure that women are making an informed decision
before they have an abortion,113 it should be permissible for government to try
107

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 876 (1992).
109 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion
and Gun Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97, 98-101 (1997) (discussing the “congruence of
rhetoric, political strategy, and regulatory proposals” between proponents of abortion rights
and gun rights); Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the
Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1286-87 (2009) (discussing the intersection between abortion and
gun-right claims by comparing the issues of partial-birth abortion and assault weapons).
110 See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (comparing Heller to Roe); Richard A. Posner, In
Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 (arguing that the Court made
the same “mistake” in Heller and in Roe).
111 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
112 To be sure, waiting periods for gun purchases typically have been justified on the
ground of allowing time to check out the purchaser because of potential harmful
consequences if guns get into the hands of certain people.
113 Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87.
108

2014]

ORDERED GUN LIBERTY

867

to be sure that persons are making an informed decision before they purchase a
gun. For example, government might inform people about the dangers of gun
ownership by presenting statistics about the dangers of having a gun in one’s
home: statistics about gun deaths in the home each year, including gun deaths
by suicide, accident, and homicide.114 Finally, if government may encourage
alternatives to abortion,115 it should be permissible for government to
encourage alternatives to keeping and bearing arms. For example, there are
alternatives to buying a gun for self-defense, such as home security systems.
We also briefly sketch how a regret rationale might figure in gun control.
Casey justified an informed consent scheme as a way to prevent the problem of
women making an ill-informed decision and later experiencing “devastating
psychological consequences.”116 Casey also characterized abortion itself as an
act “fraught with consequences” for the pregnant woman and many others
(including, depending on one’s perspective, the fetus).117 Gonzales v. Carhart
went further by invoking Casey’s language about “consequences” to accept the
“regret rationale” as justifying restrictions on the right to abortion.118 By
analogy, one might argue that many who have purchased guns may not fully
appreciate the consequences of gun ownership for themselves and others and
may come to regret their decisions after the guns have been used to kill or
wound people. Also analogous to Carhart’s invocation of the regret rationale
to justify banning certain procedures for performing abortions, one might argue
that a regret rationale supports banning certain weapons.119
Finally, we mention an analogy between sex education in schools and gun
safety education in schools. Liberals and conservatives switch sides when it
comes to sex and guns. With sex education, many conservatives want
abstinence-only education, on the premise that there is no “safe” sex except sex
“saved” for marriage; by contrast, liberals favor comprehensive sex education
(combining abstinence with information about contraception), on the premise
that at least some minors are going to have sex and should learn how to behave
“responsibly” to protect themselves against the consequences.120 With guns

114

See infra text accompanying notes 180-83 (summarizing statistics on gun-related
injuries in the home).
115 Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (upholding an informed consent provision that included
informing a woman of alternatives to abortion).
116 Id. at 882.
117 Id. at 852.
118 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
119 Elsewhere, we critically evaluate this appeal to the regret rationale in the Carhart
majority opinion. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 68-75. Further, we agree with
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that, even if one (contrary to the weight of the evidence) gave
credence to the argument about regret, under Casey the proper regulatory response would be
to foster informed consent, not to ban a procedure outright with no health exception. See
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120 See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY,
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many liberals want no guns in the home, while conservatives assume that guns
are going to be around and want to protect against the consequences. Just as we
support comprehensive sex education in the schools, so too we would support
gun safety education in the schools.121
In sum, even when a “fundamental right” is in play, the Supreme Court has
not applied “strict scrutiny” and automatically invalidated all regulations. The
mistaken belief that it has done so derives from the general myth of strict
scrutiny as well as the specific Second Amendment myth of strict scrutiny. Our
aim in talking about the myth of strict scrutiny is not to make a doctrinal
argument concerning interpretation of the Second Amendment. Rather, we are
concerned with the illusion of absoluteness in gun rights talk and with bringing
out the wide latitude that protecting an individual right to bear arms, like other
rights, leaves for government to encourage responsible exercise of the right.
V.

A FORM OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: THE TWO-STEP FRAMEWORK OF
RECOGNIZING RIGHTS YET PERMITTING REGULATIONS

Given the recognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms in Heller,
what is the most appropriate level of scrutiny for gun control measures? In
Ordered Liberty we show that, contrary to Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, the
Court has not recognized two rigidly policed tiers of scrutiny, with strict
scrutiny automatically invalidating laws and deferential rational basis scrutiny
automatically upholding them.122 Instead, we demonstrate that the cases map
onto a “rational continuum” of ordered liberty, with several intermediate tiers
to be mentioned below.123 In this Part, we are using the term “intermediate
scrutiny” in a generic sense to encompass a range of standards, not in the
specific sense of equal protection intermediate scrutiny doctrine.
Under Heller, the individual right to bear arms does not, on the one hand,
trigger strict scrutiny for the reasons already given. Nor does it, on the other
hand, entail deferential rational basis scrutiny. For one thing, Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion rejected the latter in Heller.124 For another, it is not
appropriate where a “fundamental right” is in play, even if many traditional
gun control laws are “presumptively lawful.”125 Nor is straight balancing of
AND RESPONSIBILITY 256-89 (2006) (contrasting these two approaches to sex education,
emphasizing their competing approaches to encouraging sexual and reproductive
responsibility among adolescents).
121 One further analogy: If there is a right to stand your ground in self-defense where
firearms are concerned, there should be an analogous right to self-defense where abortion is
concerned. Eileen McDonagh’s work in developing such analogies has been illuminating
and powerful. See EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE
TO CONSENT 7 (1996) (discussing “abortion as self-defense”).
122 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 239-44.
123 Id. at 241-44.
124 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
125 Id. at 626-27 n.26.
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interests (which Scalia attributed to Justice Breyer’s dissent) appropriate where
gun regulations are concerned; Scalia rejected it too in Heller.126 Nonetheless,
a more sophisticated, structured, and stringent form of balancing, akin to
proportionality review (which is the standard for which Breyer actually
argued127), should not be off the table.
Instead, the choice is among other available frameworks like those we lay
out in our “rational continuum” of ordered liberty. All of these lie between
absolutist “strict scrutiny” and highly deferential rational basis scrutiny:
• Undue burden standard under the Due Process Clause
• Intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
• Forms of intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment
• A form of intermediate scrutiny under the Due Process Clause
• Rational basis scrutiny “with bite” under the Equal Protection Clause or the
Due Process Clause
Under all of these frameworks, the Court protects a right but allows room for
regulation.
Which is the most apt framework for the individual right to keep and bear
arms? Given Heller, we need a framework that acknowledges at once that (1)
the right is a “fundamental right,” and yet (2) many regulations concerning it
are “presumptively lawful.”128 Several courts that have considered this
question since Heller, not surprisingly, have adopted forms of intermediate
scrutiny.129 But we should recognize that there are several forms of
intermediate scrutiny (those under the Equal Protection Clause, the First
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause) and that they have been adopted for
different reasons.
Consider the context in which intermediate scrutiny has been developed
under the Equal Protection Clause. It has been applied to classifications based

126

Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 689-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Breyer argued that:
[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn
into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the
only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former
in the course of advancing the later. I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing
inquiry explicitly.
Id.
128 See id. at 626-27 n.26 (majority opinion).
129 E.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will apply intermediate
scrutiny here.”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“Because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state regulation of the
carrying of firearms in public, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate in this
case.”); NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 205
(5th Cir. 2012) (“Unquestionably, the challenged federal laws trigger nothing more than
‘intermediate’ scrutiny.”); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261-62 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.”).
127
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on characteristics that are not judged to be suspect, yet not deemed to be
altogether nonsuspicious – neither like racial classifications on the one hand130
nor like the regulation of businesses such as opticians on the other.131
Intermediate scrutiny has been applied to what one of us has called “somewhat
suspicious classifications” like gender.132 The Court has also applied rational
basis scrutiny “with bite” to some somewhat suspicious classifications such as
sexual orientation.133
With gender we apply intermediate scrutiny because, given the long history
of gender-based classifications that denied women equal rights and
responsibilities, we are suspicious of the ends that the government is
promoting (they may be sexist) and we are suspicious of the fit between means
and ends (the laws may be using gender as an inaccurate or unjustifiable proxy
for other, more germane bases of classification).134 Or, with sexual orientation,
we apply rational basis scrutiny “with bite” because we are concerned that the
government, instead of furthering a legitimate governmental purpose, may be
expressing “animus” against or a “bare desire to harm” a politically unpopular
group.135 Or we take a more careful look because, as Justice Kennedy put it in
another context, “we are beginning to understand” that “prejudice . . . rises not
from malice or hostile animus alone,” but also “from insensitivity caused by
simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism
to guard against people who appear to be different in some respects from
ourselves.”136

130 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (“At the very least, the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes,
be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’”).
131 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Williamson
articulated the classical formulation of deferential rational basis scrutiny: “It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.” Id.
132 WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & STEPHEN MACEDO,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1041-53 (5th ed. 2014). We describe gender
as a “somewhat suspicious category.” Id. at 1049 (mentioning Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), which held that “to withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives”).
133 Id. at 1051-52 (mentioning United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); and
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
134 See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
135 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681 (“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973))); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-35 (holding an amendment banning
protection based on sexual orientation unconstitutional, in part because “the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus”).
136 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
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Neither of these situations is present in gun control regulations. We are not
suspicious of the government’s proposed end to protect the security of all and
to prevent harm (despite the slippery slope fear that government seeks to
disarm its citizens). And only a paranoid person would think that gun control
measures reflect animus against or a bare desire to harm gun owners. We grant,
however, that some opposition to gun control measures is rooted in the idea
that the means are not well suited to the ends.137 For example, the “more guns
less crime” folks make a version of this argument.138 In any case, we would not
argue for adopting the analytics of Equal Protection Clause intermediate
scrutiny for analyzing gun control regulations.
We think two Due Process frameworks might be more analogous to the
situation of the individual right to keep and bear arms than the Equal
Protection frameworks for intermediate scrutiny just mentioned. The first is
Moore v. City of East Cleveland’s139 form of intermediate scrutiny. Moore did
not officially articulate intermediate scrutiny as the framework for Due Process
analysis. Still, it formulated the test as: “[W]hen the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged regulation.”140 That sounds more
like a form of intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny. Justice Powell added:
“Of course, the family is not beyond regulation.”141 Like Moore, many cases
surrounding the legal regulation of the family demonstrate the following twostep framework:
1. Determine that the right in question – for example, the right to marry, the
right to decide one’s family living arrangements, or the right to parental
liberty – is fundamental.
2. Conclude that even though the right is fundamental, it does not entail that
reasonable regulations are unconstitutional.142
Moreover, the regulations analyzed under such two-step frameworks
typically are justified on the ground of protecting people (for example, spouses
and children) from harm.143 With the right to bear arms, Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Heller uses an analogous two-step:

concurring).
137 WINKLER, supra note 15, at 35-43 (contending that some gun control “extremists”
supported measures that would not have any positive effect and that some criticism was
rooted in this recognition).
138 See, e.g., LOTT, supra note 59.
139 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
140 Id. at 499.
141 Id.
142 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 254-57 (assessing the standard of review
applied by Justice Powell in his plurality opinion in Moore).
143 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1943) (holding that parental
and religious liberties are not immune from regulation, particularly where the safety of
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1. State that the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right.
2. Acknowledge that, despite its being a fundamental right, many traditional
gun control regulations are “presumptively lawful.”144
Likewise, the regulations are commonly justified to protect people from
harm. The analytics of such a two-step framework are different from the
balancing that Justice Scalia rejected in Heller. We argue that a form of
intermediate scrutiny analogous to that of Moore under the Due Process Clause
is a strong candidate for the appropriate framework for thinking about rights
and responsibilities under Heller for gun control regulation.
Let us note two additional similarities. First, in Moore, Justice Powell
speaks of the Court’s recognition of the “private realm of family life” and of
the constitutional protection of personal choice of family members forming a
household.145 In Heller, Justice Scalia stresses the home as a site of the family
and the right to defend oneself and one’s family within the home.146 Second,
Moore also captures the intergenerational dimension of the constitutionally
protected family, stressing that the extended family plays a role in rearing,
educating, and inculcating values in children.147 Similarly, social reproduction
is evidently part of what, for many Americans, owning guns is about; those
Americans celebrate intergenerational participation in hunting, recreational
shooting, and so forth, and argue that such activities instill responsibility and
virtues.148
The second Due Process framework that is analogous to the situation of the
individual right to keep and bear arms is the Casey undue burden standard.
Again, Roe had applied strict scrutiny, but Casey rejected that in favor of an
“undue burden” standard.149 Casey states that “[w]hat is at stake is the
woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from
all others in doing so.”150 Under an undue burden standard, regulations that
seek to encourage responsible, conscientious exercise of the right in light of the
potential consequences of that exercise are permitted. Regulations that seek to
coerce the ultimate decision, however, are not.151 Accordingly, Casey found
that informed consent requirements, reporting requirements, and a waiting
requirement did not impose an undue burden on the right to make the ultimate

children is involved).
144 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 n.26 (2008).
145 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
146 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
147 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-05.
148 See, e.g., McIntire, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing arguments for “selling a new
generation on guns” that emphasize “family” and “fun” and arguments that use of firearms
“can teach ‘life skills’ like responsibility, ethics and citizenship”).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
150 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
151 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 63-64.
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decision.152 We would argue that the undue burden standard of Casey is also a
strong candidate for the appropriate framework under Heller for gun control
regulation. As suggested previously, we think that many gun control
regulations are analogous to abortion regulations that have been upheld under
an undue burden standard.153
To recapitulate: Our aim in this Section is not to resolve any doctrinal
problems in the interpretation of the Second Amendment after Heller. Instead,
we are just trying to frame how the analysis should proceed concerning rights,
responsibilities, and regulation. We turn next to an area where the applicable
responsibilities are especially grave, and the justifications for regulation
especially weighty: children and guns. Gun safety measures intended to protect
children from the dangers of guns in the home should readily be upheld as
constitutional, whether under a form of intermediate scrutiny or an undue
burden standard.
VI. CHILDREN AND GUNS: PARENTAL RIGHTS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES
In this Part we address several issues about children, guns, and the Second
Amendment. Again, our aim is not to resolve any particular doctrinal issues
concerning interpretation of the right to bear arms, but rather to frame some of
the issues in terms of rights, responsibilities, and regulation. The topic of
children and guns concerns the intersection of Second Amendment rights with
fundamental parental liberty, family privacy, children’s own rights and needs,
and governmental authority (as Prince v. Massachusetts put it) to enact
reasonable regulations that protect children from harm or evils and further the
“healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens.”154 This is the two-step approach to constitutional rights to which we
referred above: the Court may speak of the rights at issue in the context of
regulating guns to protect children as fundamental, but it quickly adds that
such rights are not absolute and that the family is not immune from
regulation.155 Moreover, it bears emphasis that the state’s authority to protect
children and restrict parental liberty “as parens patriae” is particularly pertinent
to the issue of gun regulation; this includes securing children’s growth against
dangers.156

152

Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-901.
See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text. Finally, we should mention Adam
Winkler’s argument, pre-Heller, that state supreme courts protecting the right to bear arms
under state constitutions had applied a form of rational basis scrutiny “with bite.” Adam
Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 725-26 (2007).
154 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
155 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (outlining the two-step framework
used in many cases surrounding the legal regulation of the family).
156 Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-70.
153
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Keeping Children Safe from Guns in the Home

Regulation to protect children from the dangers that guns pose relates, as we
see it, to three spheres that are familiar from the Court’s jurisprudence about
the triangle of parent, child, and state: the home, the school, and the street (that
is, public spaces where children may be when they are not at home or in
school). Since the Newtown shooting, many proposed gun regulations aim to
make children safer in schools; even prior to Newtown, highly publicized
school shootings (such as at Columbine) intensified concerns by public
authorities to keep children safe in schools.157 Prince upheld a state labor law
intended to protect children from dangers they might encounter on the street.158
Today, in light of the dangers that gun violence in the streets poses to minors
and young adults (particularly due to gang membership),159 some regulations
and public-private initiatives aim at reducing or eliminating guns in that
context.160 In this Article, we focus on guns in the home. We use this example
because of the rhetorical emphasis on the home in constitutional jurisprudence
concerning the family and (in Heller) the Second Amendment, and the focus
on the home in absolutist gun rights claims about the risk of overweening
governmental power reaching into the home.
In Heller, Justice Scalia speaks about a core Second Amendment right to use
a handgun to protect oneself and one’s family in the home, “where the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”161 Thus, one argument for
gun rights is protecting children, keeping them safe from intruders and
aggressors. Indeed, Winkler reports a marked shift in the NRA’s philosophy
from an earlier focus on hunting and recreational shooting (that is, a
“traditional means of bonding between father and son”) to, in recent decades, a
focus on self-defense and protecting personal liberty, with the Second

157 See Lloyd Vries, Columbine Legacy: Schools Safer?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2004,
12:28 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/columbine-legacy-schools-safer, archived at
http://perma.cc/ER98-AZUM (assessing how schools have responded with security
measures after the Columbine school shooting).
158 Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
159 See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Unlearning Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2013, at
A27 (reporting a statement by a researcher that “[i]f you are a gang member, your No. 1 fear
is getting shot” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160 Id. (reporting efforts by organizations like CeaseFire and Save Our Streets to
intervene to prevent gun violence and praising a public health, epidemiological perspective).
President Clinton framed gun control as part of a broader crime prevention effort to “recover
our Nation’s streets from crime and violence,” and “to provide security for our families and
our children.” Remarks on the Assault Weapons Ban, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 582,
582 (Apr. 6, 1998). For a critical evaluation of the 1994 assault weapons ban, see David
Corn, What the Fight over Clinton’s Assault Weapons Ban Can Teach Obama, MOTHER
JONES (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012-12/bill-clinton-assault=
weapon-ban-newtown-shooting, archived at http://perma.cc/493G-FZUJ.
161 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
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Amendment as a necessary bulwark to ensure guns for personal protection
against criminals.162
On the other hand, keeping children safe from guns in the home is one
rationale used for regulating gun owners to the extent of requiring those with
minors in the home to store their weapons safely and securely. As one research
team put it (reported in an article by Jane Brody) “[p]arents . . . are the first
line of defense for children” in this regard through “safe storage of
firearms.”163 One way to keep children safe from guns is just not to have them
in the home, as the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends: “The
absence of guns from children’s homes and communities is the most reliable
and effective measure to prevent firearm-related injuries in children and
adolescents.”164 And of course, while parents could follow this rule voluntarily,
Heller rules out mandating it.165 How, then, may rights be linked with
responsibility?
One way is through safe storage laws, or “child access prevention” (CAP)
laws, which require adults to take measures to reduce children’s access to guns
at home.166 No doubt everyone (including readers of this Symposium) has seen
news coverage with heartbreaking stories about unintentional deaths of young
– and not so young – children, due to children shooting themselves or others
with guns they found in the home lying within reach and loaded, rather than
locked away and unloaded.167 Sometimes, the gun was lying on top of a
television set where parents either did not think a toddler knew the gun was
stored, or thought the gun was out of the toddler’s reach; guns were also
sometimes (temporarily) under a sofa cushion, on a chair, and so forth.168
162

WINKLER, supra note 15, at 65-68.
Jane Brody, Keeping Guns out of Children’s Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2004, at F7
(internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting the remarks of North Dakota State University
researchers related to their efforts to teach children safe gun practices).
164 Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 2012 PEDIATRICS e1416,
e1416.
165 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570 (invalidating a ban on handgun possession and recognizing
“an individual right to possess a firearm . . . and to use that arm for traditionally lawful
purposes, such as self-defense within the home”).
166 See Child Access Prevention Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE
(Aug. 1, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/child-access-prevention-policy-summary, archived
at http://perma.cc/M2TP-JL6A (providing an overview of Child Access Prevention laws).
For an informative argument in favor of CAP laws as a way to avoid the “deadly
consequences of irresponsible firearm storage,” since “not all gun owners are responsible
and even responsible gun owners are not responsible one hundred percent of the time,” see
Andrew J. McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws: A Common Sense Approach to Gun
Control, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47, 77 (1999).
167 Reporter Joe Nocera chronicles these and other gun deaths and injuries in his blog,
Gun Report. See Joe Nocera, Gun Report, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, http://nocera.blogs.nytimes.
com/category/gun-report (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
168 See Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll, N.Y.
163
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Consider the New York Times article, Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll,
which featured a photo of a three-year-old boy, Lucas Heagren, smiling
radiantly as his father, Joshua, helps him hold and learn how to fire a .22 rifle
he gave Lucas for Christmas.169 Five months later, Lucas found a pistol that his
father generally kept under his mattress, but had temporarily put under the
couch; his father was going out shooting that day, but was taking time to set up
an inflatable swimming pool. Lucas died after he shot himself in the eye. The
father was charged and convicted of negligent homicide and endangering
children.
Many – indeed, millions – of children live in households with guns that are
neither locked away nor kept unloaded.170 Estimates vary, but one study
concluded that between “20 percent to 50 percent of gun-owning parents
engage in unsafe storage practices.”171 Why is safe storage so important? Not
only do “[m]ore than three-fourths of unintentional firearm injuries to children
occur in private dwellings,” but “[i]n most cases . . . children got their hands on
a loaded gun in their own home or the home of a friend or relative.”172 It is not
simply children who live in homes where guns are stored unsafely who are at
risk of injury or death. The Children and Guns news article reported on a gun
death of an eleven-year-old boy, Alex, whose mother sought to ensure that her
children did not visit or play at homes where guns were stored. Alex was killed
when he and a group of teenage boys “found a Glock pistol in an apartment
closet . . . while searching for snack money,” and the gun went off when a
fifteen-year-old boy was handling it.173 In another case involving adolescents,
Noah, a fourteen-year-old boy, was killed during a sleepover at the home of his
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at A1.
169 Id.
170 See Child Access Prevention Policy Summary, supra note 166. As stated in the
testimony of Juliet A. Leftwich:
Researchers have found that millions of children live in homes with easily accessible
guns. A 2000 study of firearm storage patterns in U.S. homes found that “[o]f the
homes with children and firearms, 55% were reported to have 1 or more firearms in an
unlocked place, and 43% reported keeping guns without a trigger lock in an unlocked
place.” A 2005 study on adult firearm storage practices in U.S. homes found that over
1.69 million children and youth under age 18 were living in homes with loaded and
unlocked firearms.
Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008: Hearing on Bill 17-843 Before the Comm. on
Pub. Safety and the Judiciary Council of D.C., 17th Period (D.C. 1998) (testimony of Juliet
A. Leftwich, Legal Director of Legal Community Against Violence), archived at http://
perma.cc/66CZ-CDHD.
171 Brody, supra note 163 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting an estimate by
North Dakota State researchers based on several studies); see also Firearm-Related Injuries
Affecting the Pediatric Population, supra note 164, at e1419 (“In a study of gun-owning
Americans with children under 18 years old, 21.7% stored a gun loaded, 31.5% stored a gun
unlocked, and 8.3% stored at least 1 gun unlocked and loaded.”).
172 Brody, supra note 163.
173 Luo & McIntire, supra note 168, at A1.
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close friend, Levi, who lived with his grandparents, when the boys found a .45
caliber handgun behind a television set.174 Although the grandfather “had
always admonished” Levi “never to handle the weapons,” Levi “removed the
magazine, pointed the gun at his friend and pulled the trigger,” evidently not
realizing that there was still a round in the chamber.175 Strikingly, Noah’s
mother opposed the prosecution of Levi for reckless homicide, telling the court
that “the adults who failed to properly secure the gun were the ones who
should be punished.”176 Ohio, the same state where Lucas lived, however, has
no safe-storage law.177
These stories have common features: parental admonitions not to touch guns
were insufficient to prevent lethal injury, a point to which we turn below.
Moreover, there is a gendered dimension to the problem: in the cases examined
by the New York Times, “a common theme . . . was the almost magnetic
attraction of firearms among boys.”178 Indeed, the shooter was male in “all but
a handful of instances,” and over eighty percent of the victims were male.179
Besides unintentional injuries, there are other harms from guns in the home.
A gun in the home increases the risk of youth suicide, which was the third
leading cause of death for American teens ages fifteen to nineteen in 2009.180
Firearms are “the most lethal” of the common methods used for attempting
suicide, with a ninety-percent lethality rate.181 In 2010 “67.5% of all homicides
were committed with a firearm,” and “[m]ost homicides occur[red] during
interpersonal conflict, typically between relatives, friends, or
acquaintances.”182 Young black men have the highest rates of firearm-related
homicides of any demographic group.183
In light of the risks posed to children from unsafe storage of guns in the
home, one reasonable regulation is safe storage, or CAP laws. Such laws vary
from state to state.184 The strictest laws impose criminal liability on adults who

174

Id.
Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, supra note 164, at
e1418.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 State Child Access Prevention to Guns, SMART GUN LAWS (Jan. 3, 2012), http://smart
gunlaws.org/category/state-child-access-prevention-to-guns, archived at http://perma.cc/L3
K2-P2WJ (providing information on CAP laws in different states); McClurg, supra note 166
(detailing the history and variety of state CAP laws). Congress has considered, but not
passed, federal CAP laws. See, e.g., id. at 50-51 (describing proposed Children’s Gun
Violence Prevention Act of 1998).
175
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negligently leave firearms accessible to children when a child may or is likely
to gain access to a gun.185 A larger number impose liability only when children
actually gain access to the gun.186 And other state laws impose liability only if
the child uses the gun or carries it to a public place.187 A minority of states
have CAP laws.188 Some other states simply impose criminal liability when a
person intentionally, knowingly and/or recklessly provides firearms to
minors.189
These CAP laws seem to be effective in protecting children.190 Similarly,
education programs aimed at adults about safe storage seem to lead to more
people storing guns safely.191 We believe that such CAP laws are a reasonable
regulation aimed at preventing unnecessary injury and loss of life. Certainly,
under Prince, the governmental interest in protecting children from harm
justifies limits upon fundamental parental liberty and parental religious
liberty.192 These safe storage laws, to put it another way, do not place an undue
burden on gun rights. Unlike the law struck down in Heller, they do not require
that guns be kept completely disassembled without any exceptions.193
Nonetheless, the NRA rejects these laws as part of “gun grabbers’ wholesale
attack on private gun ownership” and a step toward civil disarmament:
Responsible gun owners store their guns safely. For over a century, the
National Rifle Association and other civic groups have done everything
they can to encourage safe gun storage.

185

Luo & McIntire, supra note 168, at A1; Child Access Prevention Policy Summary,
supra note 166.
186 See sources cited supra note 185.
187 See sources cited supra note 185.
188 Brody, supra note 163 (“Eighteen states have laws that make improper firearm
storage a crime . . . .”); Child Access Prevention Policy Summary, supra note 166 (observing
that only fourteen states and the District of Columbia have laws imposing criminal liability
for negligent storage of a firearm).
189 Child Access Prevention Policy Summary, supra note 166 (“Several states impose a
weaker standard for criminal liability when a child is allowed to access a firearm. Fourteen
prohibit persons from intentionally, knowingly, and/or recklessly providing some or all
firearms to children.”).
190 Id. See also McClurg, supra note 166, at 57 (citing study of the effects of CAP laws
in 12 states). But see TASK FORCE ON CMTY. PREVENTIVE SERVS., FIRST REPORTS
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING VIOLENCE: FIREARMS
LAWS (2003), archived at http://perma.cc/BK5F-S7YW (finding statistically significant the
apparent reduction in unintentional firearm deaths due to Florida’s CAP law, while noting
that “overall, too few studies of CAP law effects have been done, and the findings of
existing studies were inconsistent” and calling for “further high-quality research . . . to
establish the relationship between firearm laws and violent outcomes.”).
191 Brody, supra note 163.
192 Prince v. Massachusetts, 131 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
193 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
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Partly as a result, the fatal gun accident rate for both kids and adults has
fallen to an all-time low. In spite of this, anti-gun politicians, and the antigun groups are working to turn “safe storage” into a tool for disarming
the American public.194
In effect the NRA rejects regulation in favor of exhorting adults to “do the
right thing” or to close the gap between having a right and exercising it
responsibility.195 Thus the NRA concedes that with gun rights come the “duty”
of storing guns safely, though it contends that “[h]ome safety is the
responsibility of the family, not the state.”196 But the reported rates of unsafe
storage – or, dare we say, of irresponsible gun ownership – suggest that
exhortation may not be enough.
The NRA also counters: educate, do not regulate. In effect it advocates
relying on exhortation. The NRA has a widely used Eddie Eagle Firearm
Safety program, which a number of state legislatures have endorsed197 and
school districts have adopted.198 The four messages are: “If you see a gun:
STOP! Don’t Touch! Leave the Area! Tell an Adult.”199 The premise of this
program is that guns are an inevitable part of life; children need to be taught
how to behave around guns.200 In other words, you simply need to “gun proof”
children, not treat guns as something dangerous and therefore bad.201
194

David Kopel, The Hidden Agenda Behind Gun Storage Laws, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS.
ACTION (Oct. 5, 1999), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/1999/the-hidden-agendabehind-gun-storage-la.aspx?s=hidden+agenda, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2TZ-8ZGT.
195 See id. (arguing that gun owners store their guns responsibly, and thus gun storage
laws are not necessary).
196 Id.
197 E.g., Eddie Eagle Gun Safety Program, H.R. 293, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 1995-96) (adopting a resolution for “encouraging school systems in Georgia to adopt
the Eddie Eagle Gun Safety Program of the National Rifle Association and commending the
National Rifle Association for its development of this program”).
198 In Virginia, for example, the Board of Education adopted the Elementary School Gun
Safety Guidelines and Curriculum and provided that “[t]he curriculum guidelines shall
incorporate principles of firearm safety accident prevention and the rules of the National
Rifle Association’s Eddie Eagle Gunsafe Program.” See COMMONWEALTH OF VA., BD. OF
EDUC., ELEMENTARY SCHOOL GUN SAFETY GUIDELINES AND CURRICULUM 1 (2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/K6VC-GW8H. The Program is called “Finnigan Fox Says,” and
has the slogans: “See a GUN? Leave It Alone, Leave the Area, Let an Adult Know!” Id.
199 Eddie Eagle: What Is the Eddie Eagle GunSafe Program?, NRA (2012), http://eddie
eagle.nra.org, archived at http://perma.cc/5RTJ-6JZ2.
200 For an unrelenting critique of the NRA’s approach and its gun safety program along
these lines, see VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., JOE CAMEL WITH FEATHERS: HOW THE NRA WITH
GUN AND TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOLLARS USES ITS EDDIE EAGLE PROGRAM TO MARKET GUNS
TO KIDS (1997), archived at http://perma.cc/P2Y7-L5RW.
201 Id. § 2 (“It’s hard to tell them that guns can be dangerous, without giving them that
message that guns are bad, and that’s a delicate situation that we try to work around with . . .
Eddie Eagle.” (quoting Jeffrey Poole, NRA, Managing Director of Shows and Exhibits)).
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Studies, however, have not found these programs to be effective. As the
American Academy of Pediatrics reports: “Gun avoidance programs are
designed to educate children as a way of reducing firearm injury (e.g., Eddie
Eagle, STAR); however, several evaluation studies have demonstrated that
such programs do not prevent risk behaviors and may even increase gun
handling among children.”202
One of the stories in the New York Times article on Children and Guns
concerned an eleven-year-old boy who was so excited about gun safety class
that night that he wanted to practice, and ended up killing his twelve-year-old
sister.203 The Violence Policy Center, a sharp critic of the Eddie Eagle
approach, offers more examples of children who had gun safety instruction
nevertheless killing or injuring themselves or other children with a family
gun.204 And three-year-old Lucas’s father thought he had taught Lucas to
respect firearms and to handle his Christmas present only when an adult was
present, just as thirteen-year-old Levi’s grandfather admonished him never to
handle guns.
Some clues about why those parental admonitions and gun education
programs might not be so effective may be found in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
trio of cases explaining why the death penalty and mandatory life without
parole for minors constitute cruel and unusual punishment.205 In Miller v.
Alabama206 the Court observed certain differences between minors and adults
that are applicable in other contexts. These differences help illustrate why
addressing the risks that guns in the home pose to children is better achieved
by supplementing gun education (focused on avoiding guns) with actual
regulations requiring adults to take steps to keep children safe:
1. Children’s “lack of maturity” and “underdeveloped sense of responsibility”
lead to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk taking.207 For example,
children may pick up and play with a gun, even if instructed not to do so.

202 Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, supra note 164, at
e1420.
203 Luo & McIntire, supra note 168, at A1.
204 VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 200, § 3.
205
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (finding mandatory “life without parole”
sentences unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied to offenders who were
under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011 (2010) (holding that imposing “life without parole” on a minor who did not commit
homicide violates the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(forbidding imposition of death penalty on minors who were under the age of eighteen when
they committed their crimes). For background on these cases, see generally Sara E. Fiorillo,
Mitigating After Miller: Legislative Considerations and Remedies for the Future of Juvenile
Sentencing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2095 (2013).
206 Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
207 Id. at 2458 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. Children “‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside
pressures,’ including from their family and peers; they have limited
‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.”208 For example, even if
parents and grandparents admonish children not to touch a gun unless an
adult is present, children may do so anyway when they are with their peers.
Or children may be vulnerable in their own home from unsafely stored guns
as well as when they visit a home where guns are stored unsafely.
As the American Academy of Pediatrics elaborates: “Accompanying
characteristics [of adolescence] may be curiosity, the strong influence of the
peer group, rites of passage, belief in invincibility, impulsiveness, immaturity,
mood swings, and substance abuse.”209 These characteristics and
developmental differences between children and adults, gleaned from the study
of child development and of neuroscience, suggest why lessons about gun
safety may not be enough to make children “gun proof” or “gun safe” unless
those lessons are reinforced by safe practices in the home.210 As public health
researchers put it in an article written in Pediatrics: “Because children cannot
be made ‘gun safe,’ their environments must be made safe by removing the
most dangerous guns.”211
Why not put the burden of responsibility for making the home safe on the
parent/gun owner instead of making children responsible for dealing with guns
they need not even encounter if guns were kept locked away? We would
suggest that opposition to such laws illustrates where absolutist rights talk –
rather than the Constitution itself – seems to be a problem.
A common response in discussions about whether the deaths caused by
unsafe gun storage warrant a regulatory response is that the problem receives
disproportionate attention, since more children die every year from swimming
pool accidents than from accidental gun deaths.212 Thus, they contend that

208

Id.
Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, supra note 164, at
e1419.
210 Brody, supra note 163 (reporting that North Dakota psychologists compared the NRA
program with one they devised “that taught 4- and 5-year-old children behavioral skills to
prevent firearm injuries,” and concluded that “such lessons were best taught at home, where
most gun-related injuries occur”).
211 Judith Cohen Dollins & Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Reducing Violent Injuries:
Priorities for Pediatrician Advocacy, 94 PEDIATRICS 638, 646 (1994).
212 More than one person made this move when we presented this Article at the live
Symposium. Adam Winkler provides a good example:
Perhaps the most powerful image in the gun control arsenal is of a young child finding
her daddy’s gun and accidentally shooting herself or her little brother. Even here,
however, the statistics show that the problem is far less pervasive than often believed.
Less than 3 percent of firearms fatalities are caused by accidents, and only a fraction of
these involved pre-adolescent children. Far more young children drown in swimming
pools than die of accidental gunshot wounds.
209

882

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:849

accidental “shootings are ‘at the bottom of the list of causes of accidental harm
to children.’”213 Memorably, Gun Owners of America has asserted that
“children are ‘130 percent more likely to die from choking on their dinner’
than from accidental gun shootings.”214 Gun rights proponents make similar
arguments about other things that are commonly found in homes and may be
sources of harm to children. For example, in promoting the Eddie Eagle Safety
Program as a way to protect children and promote safety, the NRA normalizes
having guns in the home by stating that, “[l]ike swimming pools, electrical
outlets, matchbooks and household poison, [firearms are] treated simply as a
fact of everyday life.”215 Why do gun control advocates, they counter, not
regulate against these risks?216 The swimming pool argument and similar ones
about selective attention to risk supposedly demonstrate that what is really at
stake is a “cultural war” over guns217: some Americans don’t like guns, are
uncomfortable around them, and hence, selectively target these childhood gun
accidents rather than other sources of injury to children.
We offer several responses to this line of argument. The first is that these
comparisons may rest on an undercounting of gun injuries. As the Children
and Guns story found, many instances in which children harmed themselves or
others were classified as homicides rather than accidents.218 As one medical
examiner explained: “Leaving a loaded weapon in an area where the child can
easily access it is neglect in our mind. Therefore parents have failed to keep a
child safe, and therefore it’s a homicide.”219 A more accurate count, the
reporters concluded, would make gun accidents “rise into the top five or six”
causes of unintentional deaths among children ages one to fourteen.220 A
further problem with comparing statistics is that a focus only on deaths ignores
the many gun-related injuries to children, since “a vast majority of victims”

WINKLER, supra note 15, at 29-30.
213 Luo & McIntire, supra note 168, at A1 (quoting an argument made by a rifle
association).
214 Id. (quoting statement on website of Gun Owners of America).
215 Eddie Eagle: What Is the Eddie Eagle GunSafe Program?, supra note 199.
216 See id. (implying that a gun is just another common household item, and thus should
be treated as other potentially hazardous items that are not regulated).
217 Sandy Levinson, for example, made this point at this Symposium in response to our
Article. Sanford Levinson, Remarks at the Boston University Law School Symposium (Nov.
15, 2013).
218 Luo & McIntire, supra note 168, at A1 (“When children are killed in unintentional
shootings, medical examiners and coroners classify many as homicides, or even suicides. A
detailed examination by The New York Times of death records, available in just a handful of
states, found that official statistics appeared to understate the actual count by about half.”).
219 Id. (quoting Dr. Lisa Kohler, who is a medical examiner in Summit County, Ohio,
where the Lucas Heagren case occurred).
220 Id. (relying on data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention for 2010).
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from firearm accidents “do not die.”221 A report presented in 2013 at the
American Academy of Pediatrics National Conference, “United States Gunshot
Violence: Disturbing Trends,” found that each year over 7000 children with
gunshot wounds are admitted to hospitals in the United States.222 The report
also found that “states with higher percentages of household firearm ownership
also tended to have higher proportions of childhood gunshot wounds,
especially those occurring in the home.”223 Notably, eighty percent of the
injuries involve the use of a handgun,224 the very weapon so prized by
Americans (as Justice Scalia wrote in Heller) for defense of self and family in
the home.225 Nearly a decade ago, Jane Brody observed that once one adds into
the count the treatment of children in emergency rooms for “nonfatal injuries
caused by a firearm,” a significant percentage of which were accidents,
“firearm injuries to children remain a serous public health concern, and the
sooner American families and communities recognize this and do something
truly constructive to counter it, the better.”226 Notably, the recent report drew a
comment from the chair of the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms that “debate about policies regarding handguns may be
necessary.”227
Second, comparing pools, poisons, and so forth with guns seems to imply
that no regulations or liability rules apply to these other things common to

221

Id. More people now survive gunshot wounds “because of the spread of hospital
trauma centers,” as well as “the increased use of helicopters to ferry patients, [and] better
training of first-responders and lessons gleaned from the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan.” Gary Fields & Cameron McWhirter, In Medical Triumph, Homicides Fall
Despite Soaring Gun Violence, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2012, at A1. The authors caution that
the declining homicide rates do not mean America has become less violent since “[t]he
reported number of people treated for gunshot attacks from 2001 to 2011 has grown by
nearly half.” Id.
222 About 7,500 Children Are Admitted to U.S. Hospitals Every Year with Gun Injuries:
Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
10/28/children-gun-injuries_n_4171208.html, archived at http://perma.cc/W3WK-S63U.
223 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
224 Id.
225 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (“The handgun ban amounts
to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American
society for [the] lawful purpose [of self-defense].”).
226 Brody, supra note 163 (reporting a national study in Pediatrics that found that
between the years 1993 and 2000, 22,661 children ages fourteen and younger “were treated
in hospital emergency rooms in the United States for nonfatal injuries caused by a firearm,”
and that “[m]ore than 43 percent of those injuries were accidents, and 41.5 percent were
deliberate assaults”).
227 About 7,500 Children Are Admitted to U.S. Hospitals Every Year with Gun Injuries:
Study, supra note 222 (reporting the view of Alan Gottlieb, who also stated that such a
debate must include both the pros and cons of gun ownership, including that guns not only
injure and kill, but also save lives).
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homes, or that homeowners – or parents – have no duties with respect to these
items. Take pools, for example. A sizeable body of case law involves litigation
brought on behalf of injured or deceased children against homeowners owning
pools; such litigation “is governed by traditional premises liability principles,
particularly those applicable to trespassing children and social guests of all
ages.”228 Such liability may be premised on inadequate supervision of minors
in a pool, on the condition of the pool (including the “[a]bsence or inadequacy
of safety or rescue equipment” at the pool), or on the failure to warn of certain
dangers (such as diving into the pool).229 Further, precisely because “each year
. . . too many young children are victims of drowning or near drowning” in
swimming pools, and state legislatures “recognize[] this threat to the health
and safety of children,” a number of states have pool safety laws that require
safety barriers (such as fences), and that authorize drowning prevention
education programs.230 Thus, swimming pools and their owners are not part of
a law-free zone.
Simply because, for example, matches are commonly found in the home
does not mean that parents may not be held liable when children discover them
and cause a fire. Indeed, some courts have found parents guilty for criminal
neglect and child endangerment when children are injured or die in such
circumstances because “[e]very responsible adult should know that fire is a
likely danger when children are left alone with access to matches.”231 Consider
also the example of household poison. Would anyone believe that parents had
done enough to protect their children from such poisons if they merely
engaged in an Eddie Eagle Gun Safety analogue, showing children household
poison and warning them that, if they encounter it – perhaps by seeing the skull
and crossbones sign – they should stop, don’t touch, leave the area, and tell an
adult? Especially with children too young to read, and who explore the world
by putting things in their mouths, the safer – and indeed expected – approach is
to keep dangerous items out of the reach of children, whether through keeping
them in a locked cabinet or otherwise out of reach.232
228

Robin Cheryl Miller, Liability of Owner of Private Residential Swimming Pool for
Injury or Death Occasioned Thereby, 64 A.L.R. 5th 1, 1 (1998).
229 Id. at 1-3.
230 ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH, RESIDENTIAL POOL
SAFETY NOTICE (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/8DK5-2DU4 (summarizing the
requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1681 (2009)). For other state pool safety laws
and state justifications for such laws, see, for example, Residential Swimming Pool Safety
Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 515 (West 2007); CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, SAFETY GUIDE FOR
HOME SWIMMING POOLS AND SPAS (n.d.), archived at http://perma.cc/86DR-ESES.
231 See, e.g., State v. Goff, 297 Or. 635, 639 (1984) (upholding a jury verdict finding a
parent guilty of child neglect where the parent “left unattended her 22-month-old child and
eight-year-old child with no supervision for a period of five hours . . . in a home containing
unlit matches and flammable material” and the children died in a fire).
232 See, e.g., ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., HOME SAFETY CHECKLIST FOR
PARENTS AND CAREGIVERS (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/FJ9C-2MRH; Rosalyn
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Guns and Parental Liberty to Rear Children

Our second point is about guns and parental liberty to rear children. For the
NRA, unregulated gun ownership is part of what it means to be an American,
and supporters want the ability to pass American values, including “respect for
guns,” on to the next generation.233 In the words of Marion Hammer, the
NRA’s first female president, who learned to shoot at the age of five:
Today, America has new enemies; enemies that are tearing at the fabric of
our heritage and our society. Those enemies are moral decay, disrespect,
parental neglect, dependence on government and phony quick-fix
government solutions to complex social problems. America’s children are
the victims of those enemies. Because we love our country, we have a
duty to America’s youngsters. They are the future of America. We must
teach them values and strengths. Teach them discipline, self-reliance,
respect and honor. Teach them to love America and what it stands for.
NRA’s Eddie Eagle Gun Safety program for young children is about
much more than just teaching safety. Youngsters learn safety but they
also learn respect for guns.234
Former NRA Chairman Charlton Heston also worried about transmitting gun
ownership to the next generation and protecting Second Amendment rights for
them.235
Hence, in addition to any rights under the Second Amendment, fundamental
parental liberty to direct and rear one’s children under the Fourteenth
Amendment – to pass along “cherished values, moral and cultural” – is also at
stake.236 But, again, this parental liberty is not absolute. Returning to Prince,
which addressed both parental liberty and religious liberty, constitutional
jurisprudence distinguishes between belief and conduct: the law does not have
to accept and exempt from regulation every parental act motivated by religious
conscience where harm to children may ensue.237 Consider, in this regard, that
although many states have spiritual treatment exemptions from medical neglect
Carson-DeWitt, Keeping Your Child Safe from Accidents, NYU LANGONE MED. CTR., http://
www.med.nyu.edu/content?ChunkIID=41384 (last updated Mar. 28, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/5DHL-ZPZ3.
233 VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 200, § 1.
234 Id. (quoting a 1995 address by Marion Hammer to the American Legion).
235 See id. An American Rifleman September 1987 magazine cover featured “Heston
surrounded by a multi-ethnic array of children” with the caption “Are Gun Rights Lost on
Our Kids?” See id. § 1. In the article, Heston refers to “a nation of children, a couple of
entire generations, that have been brainwashed into believing that the Second Amendment is
criminal in origin, rather than framed within the Constitution.” Id.
236 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 499, 504 (1976). As Justice Powell puts it in
Moore, when explaining how the Court’s prior decisions protect the “sanctity” of the family:
“It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural.” Id. at 503-04.
237 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
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laws, parental liberty under these laws is not unlimited; generally, medical care
must be provided when necessary to protect the child from serious physical
harm or illness.238 So while we can appreciate that for many parents, passing
on traditions like hunting are vital to their way of life, we need not accept
every parental act motivated by deep convictions about gun ownership and use
as a way of life. Teaching children to respect guns is not precluded by laws
requiring safe storing of guns to prevent children from harming themselves or
others. For that matter, we do not believe that gun safety education aimed at
adults and tied to the purchase and licensing of guns is an undue burden on gun
rights, particularly where children will be in the adults’ homes. It may be
justified as an effective way to protect, or reduce risks to, children.239
C.

The Role of Marketing Guns

Our third point concerns the role of the market in producing new customers.
Let us not forget that along with reproducing a way of life – producing a next
generation that values American freedoms, such as the right to bear arms –
there is also an enormous commercial, economic interest at stake: gun
manufacturers need the next generation to value and buy guns so they will be
“replacement customers.”240 Gun manufacturers create advertisements aimed
at children and presumably – since they cannot sell the guns directly to
children – their parents. One advertisement in the online Junior Shooters
magazine, for example, reads “Make Dad Jealous” and depicts a little girl who
is encouraged to “spend the day shooting and improving your skills – without
emptying dad’s wallet.”241 Keystone Sporting Arms, for example, markets

238

See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 237-38 (3d ed. 2012) (giving an
example of California’s spiritual treatment exemption and its qualification that a court shall
not assume jurisdiction except when needed to protect a child from serious harm). We do
not take a position in this Article about these exemptions, although we do note that the
American Academy of Pediatrics strongly opposes them. Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad.
of Pediatrics, Religious Objections to Medical Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279, 279 (1997)
(“[C]hildren, regardless of parental religious beliefs, deserve effective medical treatment
when such treatment is likely to prevent substantial harm or suffering or death.”).
239 Brody, supra note 163 (reporting in a follow-up study on a gun education program
aimed at adults titled “Love Our Kids, Lock Your Guns” that “77 percent of participants, up
from 48 percent, reported storing their guns in a locked compartment,” and “only 7 percent,
down from 18 percent, said they were storing their guns loaded and unlocked” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
240 VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 200, § 1.
241 Christina Wilkie & Nick Wing, This Is What Happens When the Gun Industry Sees
Kids as Customers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2013, 8:29 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/05/14/gun-industry-kids_n_3248127.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DK4
Y-8QTB; see also McIntire, supra note 64, at A1.
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“Crickett: My First Rifle” with appealing ads featuring a boy aiming his rifle at
the sunset with his faithful dog at his side.242
This advertising of guns to young children is a source of debate, particularly
because some of the fatalities and injuries occur when children use child-size
guns given to them by their parents.243 Last year, a five-year-old child
accidentally shot and killed his two-year-old sister with his child-sized Crickett
rifle. Rather than being stored safely, the rifle was “instead propped up in a
corner with a bullet still inside.”244 That child lives in Kentucky, which has no
minimum age requirement for possessing rifles or shotguns.245 Kentucky also
exempts rifles and shotguns from the law prohibiting adults from giving
children a handgun, and imposes no criminal liability for negligent storage of a
firearm, even when such access causes injury or death.246 This tragic but
preventable incident suggests the intersection of the social reproduction issue
with the issue of parental responsibility, as well as whether “responsible” gun
use by very small children is even possible. Thus, on one view, giving guns to
small children is not questioned, because “[l]earning how to use a gun at a
young age has been common for generations in rural Kentucky” and is seen as
“an essential cultural component of rural tradition.”247 On another view (voiced
by a pediatrician and coauthor of the American Academy of Pediatrics
statement on guns and children), “certain things are simply too dangerous for
young children to understand how to operate.”248
In this context gun advocates once again “push for education, not
regulation.”249 With respect to education, consider this advice by Grits
Gresham about how to use schools to reach children as future leaders and
potential customers:
Unless you and I, and all who want a good climate for shooting and
hunting, imprint our positions in the minds of those future leaders, we’re
in trouble. . . . Schools should not be a problem as far as your business is
concerned. In fact, they can be a huge asset. Think about it. Schools
collect, at one point, a large number of minds and bodies that are
important to your future well being. How else would you get these
242 See Crickett: My First Rifle, CRICKETT RIFLES (2010), http://crickett.com, archived at
http://perma.cc/7G2N-HAXF.
243 See Guns Made for Kids Spark Safety Debate, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 31, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/2013/05/guns-made-for-kids-spark-safety-debate,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y874-YMQH.
244 Id.
245 See id.
246 Id. (reporting information on Kentucky’s lax gun control laws).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. Notably, Keystone Firearms LLC itself promotes a gun safety program with
messages like “[k]ids and guns are a dangerous combination” as well as messages for adults
about safe storage. Id.
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potential customers and future leaders together, to receive your message
about guns and hunting, without the help of the schools? How much
effort and expense would be involved? Schools are an opportunity. Grasp
it.250
Even allowing for annual sales of the Bible, we do not think there is any
comparable religious product associated with parental religious belief where
marketers so keenly seek to reach new consumers. There is a reason that the
Violence Policy Center has called Eddie Eagle “Joe Camel with Feathers.”251
After all, he looks cool and shows up bigger than life at NRA firearms exhibits
– even though the NRA claims “he does not appear where firearms are being
used, displayed or sold” – as well as at gun safety programs hosted by gun
sellers like Walmart.252
In addition to marketing guns made for children, gun manufacturers take
steps to develop children’s interest in recreational use of firearms by donating
guns, ammunition, and cash to various youth groups and by sponsoring
shooting competitions.253 This youth-marketing effort stems from extensive
market research funded by the gun industry, and conducted by nonprofit
organizations that generated a “stronger emphasis on the ‘recruitment and
retention’ of new hunters and target shooters.”254 Another part of this effort by
firearms manufacturers is partnering with video game makers so that game
sellers create websites that promote the actual weapons featured in the
games.255 Video game manufacturers whet children’s appetite for guns,
including military-type weapons.256
Unfortunately, here the Constitution – or at least the First Amendment
absolutism of the current Supreme Court – may be a factor contributing to
dysfunction in the gun control debate. In 2011, in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association,257 the Court struck down California’s attempt to limit
the sale of violent video games to minors “‘in which the range of options
available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually
assaulting an image of a human being.’”258 One argument California made was
that such a law would aid parental authority over children by making sure
children had access to such games only if parents purchased them.259 The
250

VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 200, § 1 (quoting Grits Gresham, Community
Relations, S.H.O.T. BUS., Sept./Oct. 1993, at 9).
251 Id.
252 Id. § 2 (explaining how Eddie Eagle is used to promote guns to children, and
including photos of public appearances by Eddie Eagle).
253 McIntire, supra note 64, at A1.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
258 Id. at 2732 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2009)).
259 Id. at 2740.
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majority found this overinclusive and insufficiently tailored, since it restricted
children whose parents might not “care” if they purchased violent video
games.260 Justice Scalia, author of the opinion, also said that there was no
compelling evidence that playing such games had distinctively harmful effects
on children, such as encouraging aggressive behavior.261 He also noted that,
contrary to any “longstanding tradition” of not exposing children to violent
depictions in literature, American practice in schools has been the opposite.262
Justice Alito, concurring, and Justice Breyer, dissenting, strongly – and we
believe persuasively – argued that graphically violent interactive games were
different and could have harmful effects on minors.263 Justice Breyer also
persuasively appealed to the differences between minors and adults recognized
in the Court’s jurisprudence to stress the vulnerability and susceptibility of
children to these graphic and instructive forms of entertainment, precisely
because video games are “excellent teaching tools.”264
D.

Guns and Public Health

Finally, we want to make a fourth point about guns and public health.
Medical organizations, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, support
efforts to educate the general public about the danger of guns and the increased
risk of accidental injury and death associated with gun ownership.265 Some
health experts look to epidemiology and public health ideas for constructive
ways to address problems of gun violence in, for example, urban areas with
gangs.266 For example, President Obama recently nominated Dr. Vivek Murthy
for the office of Surgeon General. Murthy is, a member of Doctors for
America, a group that identifies gun violence as a “public health crisis,” and
that supports both gun control laws and “health care and evidenced [sic] based
solutions to gun violence.”267 Intense opposition by the NRA, which has
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Id. at 2741.
Id. at 2739.
262 Id. at 2736-38.
263 Id. at 2742, 2748 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court is far too quick to dismiss the
possibility that the experience of playing video games (and the effects on minors of playing
violent video games) may be very different from anything that we have seen before.”); id. at
2761, 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding California’s interest compelling and that “[t]here
are many scientific studies that support California’s view”).
264 Id. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265 Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, supra note 164, at
e1421.
266 Nocera, supra note 159, at A27.
267
DOCTORS FOR AMERICA, GUN VIOLENCE: WHAT DOES THE RESEARCH SAY? (n.d.),
archived at http://perma.cc/8AYT-KB9W. For more on the nomination of Dr. Murthy, see
Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Balks at Obama Pick for Surgeon General, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2014, at A1.
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dubbed Murthy a “rabidly anti-gun doctor” and a “radical gun grabber,”268 may
“scuttle” that nomination, as Democrats from conservative states, up for reelection, fear voting for him – and against the NRA.269 But the NRA and gun
rights proponents resist any public health framework that speaks of guns as
dangerous because it makes it sound like guns – instead of criminals – are bad
and dangerous.270 To the contrary, as we discuss above, they believe that guns
should be accepted as a normal part of life, and one just needs to teach kids
how to behave around them.271
Medical organizations urge doctors to incorporate questions about “the
presence and availability of firearms” into patient history inquiries.272 If
parents do have guns in the home, doctors should “counsel [them] about the
dangers of allowing children and adolescents to have access to guns inside and
outside the home.”273 In response to such medical efforts, Florida’s Firearm
Owner’s Privacy Act aimed to shut down these types of questions, asserting –
based on anecdotal evidence – that gun owners had been harassed and
discriminated against by doctors when they would not answer a patient
questionnaire about gun ownership.274 A court sustained a challenge by
physicians, raising First Amendment rights about the practice of medicine and
professional speech, pointing out that physicians routinely asked about guns, as
they did about other risk factors, in order to counsel patients about safety.275
The law’s legislative history, the court observed, “reinforces the conclusion
268

Obama’s Surgeon General Nominee Dr. Vivek Murthy Is a Radical Gun Grabber,
NRA INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/inthe-news/2014/2/obama%E2%80%99s-surgeon-general-nominee-dr-vivek-murthy-is-aradical-gun-grabber.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/99T8-KYUL; see also Emily Miller,
Obama’s Surgeon General Nominee Dr. Vivek Murthy Is a Radical Gun Grabber, WASH.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/10/obamassurgeon-general-nominee-dr-vivek-murthy-rad/?page=all#pagebreak, archived at http://
perma.cc/MWF3-YVRQ.
269
Peters, supra note 267, at A1; Paul M. Barrett, How the NRA Defeated Obama’s
Surgeon General Choice: 4 Blunt Points, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/189539-how-the-nra-defeated-obamas-surgeo
n-general-choice-4-blunt-points, archived at http://perma.cc/GNN4-NQ9R.
270 See Debunking the “Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People” Myth, ARMED WITH
REASON (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.armedwithreason.com/debunking-the-guns-dont-killpeople-people-kill-people-myth, archived at http://perma.cc/662H-VUDH (providing
counterarguments to the NRA’s argument that guns do not kill people, people kill people).
271 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
272 Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, supra note 164, at
e1421.
273 Id.
274 See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (accepting
physician plaintiffs’ argument that Florida’s Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act violated the First
Amendment), appeal docketed, No. 12-14009 (11th Cir. Aug. 2012).
275 Id. at 1257, 1263.
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that the law places restrictions on only one subject matter – firearm ownership”
– and that it did so because it viewed policies (like that of the American
Academy of Pediatrics) “encouraging and recommending that physicians ask
about firearms” as a “problem that the law would rectify.”276 The court held
that physicians should be able to engage in truthful, non-misleading speech to
patients, including about guns and possible risks associated with them, and
how to store them safely.277
We would argue that gun safety measures to protect children from the
dangers of guns in the home should readily be upheld as constitutional,
whether under a form of intermediate scrutiny or an undue burden standard.278
Again, while the U.S. constitutional framework affirms a private realm of
family life and the privacy of the home, that privacy is not absolute and is not
unduly burdened by medical practice aimed at taking a public health approach
to ameliorating risks to children by encouraging responsible gun storage.
CONCLUSION: GUN RIGHTS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES AND REGULATION
Now that Heller279 and McDonald280 have invalidated two of the most
restrictive gun control laws in the United States, we imagine that many of the
remaining laws will survive the appropriate test, whether a form of
intermediate scrutiny or an undue burden standard. Indeed, since those
decisions, courts have upheld most gun laws against constitutional
challenges281 and we expect that they will continue to do so. We certainly
would expect that most gun control measures proposed in the wake of the
Newtown massacre would survive such scrutiny. Even so, the largest obstacle
may be actually passing the measures in the first place. This should come as no
surprise, because gun rights are taken very seriously in the United States. Gun
rights proponents are well represented in the legislative bodies in this country.
Few rights are more sacrosanct in our constitutional culture than the individual
right to keep and bear arms. Recent efforts to pass responsible gun control
regulations have proven the truth of the line from Jimmie Rodgers’s song,
“Pistol Packin’ Papa”: “And if you don’t want to smell my smoke, don’t
monkey with my gun!”282
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Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1267.
278 We acknowledge that in Heller the Court rejected this rationale for the D.C. law, but
that law was far more restrictive than the kinds of regulations we discuss in this Section.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
279 Id. at 570.
280 McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
281 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
282 RODGERS, supra note 40.
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APPENDIX
Pistol Packin’ Papa283
I’m a pistol packin’ papa, and when I walk down the street
You can hear those mamas shoutin’: Don’t turn your gun on me!
Now girls, I’m just a good guy, and I’m goin’ to have my fun
And if you don’t want to smell my smoke, don’t monkey with my gun!
Like a hobo when he’s hungry, like a drunk man when he’s full
I’m a pistol packin’ papa, I know how to shoot the bull
The hold-up men all know me, and they sure leave me be
I’m a pistol packin’ papa, and I ramble where I please
When I have that funny feeling, that lorryin’284 ramblers call
I swing aboard some freight train, and I shoot my pistol off
Sometimes one shot will do me, sometimes takes four or five
Sometimes I shoot all around, before I’m satisfied
When you hear my pistol poppin’, you better hide yourself some place
‘Cause I ain’t made it for stoppin’, and I come from a shootin’ race
My sweetheart understands me, she says I’m her big shot
I’m her pistol packin’ daddy, and I know I’ve got the drop
You can have my Newport roadster, you can take my hard boiled hat
But you can never take from me my silver-mounted gat285
I’m a pistol packin’ papa, I’m goin’ to have my fun
Just follow me and you will hear the barking of my gun

283
284
285

Id.
Evidently means riding on a lorry, or “hoboing.”
Slang for “pistol.”

